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Effects of Alternative Policy Regimes on
Foreign-Payments Imbalances
SVBIDEY TOGAN*
Using a country-specific multisectoral general-equilibrium trade model the
paper examines the consequences of outward- and inward-oriented development
strategies. The analysis supports the view that the unwillingness of some of the
developing countries' governments to pursue outward-oriented policies can be ex-
plained in terms of low trade-elasticity values supposedly perceived by the policy
makers, and/or by the political power exercised by capitalists, whet seem to lose
most under outward-oriented policies.
1. INTRODUCTION
A recent article by Kemal Dervis, Jaime de Melo and Sherman Robinson [4]
constitutes a significant advance for the analysis of foreign-exchangeshortages in a
I developing economy. Moreover, their work has important implications for the evalu-
ation of alternative adjustment mechanism for foreign-payments imbalances.
The crucial feature of the paper by Derviset al. [4] is their combining of the
I existing descriptive analysis of the consequences of alternative adjustment mecha-
nisms with a quantitative analysis that indicates relative importance of different
policy regimes: inward orientation and outward orientation. They conclude that
I adjustment to an exogenous fall in foreign-exchange inflow by means of inward-
oriented policies is three to four times as costly in terms of lost GDP as adjustment
by means of outward-oriented strategies. The result is intuitively plausible to neo-
-classicaleconomists confident of high values of foreign-trade elasticities. Surprisingly,
however, the authors report an even more dramatic contrast when low values of
foreign-trade elasticities are assumed. According to the authors, outward orientation
is the best policy-regime in terms of minimizing GDP losses, and this result holds
irrespective of the values of foreign-trade elasticities, depriving the structuralists of
one of their main arguments.
*The author is AssociateProfessor in the Department of Econometrics, the MiddleEast
Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. The work was done while the author was an Alexander
von Humboldt Research Fellow at the Kiel Institute. The fmancial support from Alexandervon. Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The author is indebted to Egbert Gerken,
I Hasan Olgun and three anonymous referees of this journal for most useful comments.
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As is well known, the economic policies followed by many developing coun-
tries in the post-war period were greatly influenced by the ideas of structuralists
such as Raul Prebish and Gunnar Myrdal. They maintained that developing coun-
tries should expand their manufacturing industries oriented towards domestic mar-
kets as adverse foreign market conditions for primary exports and lack of competi-
tiveness in manufacturing exports would not permit the developing countries to
attain high rates of economic growth by relying on export production. The devel-
oping countries, influenced by these ideas, adopted largely inward-oriented policies.
In those countries the role of prices was de-emphasized. Output and input prices
were distorted, and reliance was placed on non-price measures of import restrictions
and credit allocations.
The slow-down of economic growth that eventually resulted from the pursuit
of an inward-oriented development strategy led to policy reforms in several of
these countries. The reforms, advocated by the neoclassicists, generally involved
reducing import restrictions, applying a system of crawling pegs, providing subsidies
to manufactured exports, adopting positive real-interest rates and introducing greater
realism in the pricing of public utilities. Thus, the role of prices in resource alloca-
tion was emphasized. Under outward-oriented strategies, those countries aimed at
producing products in which they have comparative advantage and at allowing
imports to compete with all but a few of the domestically produced goods.
The 1970s provided further evidence of the relative merits of the outward-
oriented and inward-oriented strategies. During this period, the oil-importing devel-
oping countries suffered various external shocks, which included the quadrupling of
oil prices in 1973-74, the world recession of 1974-75 and the 160-percent increase
in oil price in 1978. Given these shocks, the oil-importing developingcountries had
to make appropriate adjustment, and adjustment meant that countries had to
achieve improvements in their balance of payments to regain their pre-shock growth
path.
The effects of the external shocks of the 1970s under the two policy regimes
have been analysed recently by various economists including Balassa [3] and the.
World Bank [I 4] . These studies concentrated largely on the analysis of actual
adjustment policies, adopted by many of the non-OPEC developing countries to
counter the adverse consequences of external shocks, and concluded that outward-
oriented strategies had a superior performance in terms of exports, economic growth
and employment.
The World Bank study [14] notes that a relatively large number of countries
switched from inward-oriented to outward-oriented strategies, as the countries
adopting the latter type of strategies weathered the effects of external shocks better
than those with continued inward-orientation. But what is surprising is that a
switch also occurred lately from outward-oriented policies back to'inward-oriented
policies.
In this paper, we examine empirically the effects of alternative policy regimes
on foreign-payments imbalances, and ask the question why countries switch back
from outward-oriented to inward-oriented development strategies. We are not con-
cerned with short-run problems, but we concentrate on the study of the medium-
term to long-term problems. We use a computable general-equilibriumtrade model,
and incorporate into the model the structuralists' and neoclassicists' views by con-
sidering different values for trade elasticities. We create six plausible policy sce-
narios: inward-oriented and outward-oriented strategies under, respectively, low,
medium and high trade-elasticity values. Low elasticities represent the views of the
structuralists, whereas high elasticities represent the assumptions of high substi-
tutability between domestic goods and imports, and high export demand elasticities
employed by neoclassicists. In this way the dependence of the policies that mini-
mize the GDP losses on the values of trade elasticities are highlighted. The paper
also provides evidence of the effects of alternative policies on various income groups
in the economy. The objective is to indicate the groups that have a vested interest
in getting a specific policy implemented.
The analysis is based on a general-equilibrium trade model, developed for
Turkey, a semi-industrial country. The model is described in Section 2. The differ-
ent adjustment mechanisms considered, and the empirical results are presented in
Section 3. Finally, conclusions follow in Section 4.
2. THE MODEL
The basic framework of our analysis is a multi-sectoral general-equilibrium
trade model. The model, emphasising the importance of substitution effects in
product and factor markets, determines both the commodity and factor prices and
quantities endogenously. Following Armington [1;2], we make a distinction be-
tween domestically produced and imported commodities. For each sector, the
domestically produced and imported commodities are considered not as perfect
substitutes, as in classicalmodels of trade theory, nor as perfect complements, as in
two-gap models of trade and growth. Instead, the commodities are supposed to be
imperfect substitutes, with the substitution possibilities represented by the values of
trade substitution elasticity parameters.
The country is supposed to be small on the import side, so that the world
prices of imported commodities are fixed. On the export side, it is assumed to face
downward-sloping demand curves for each of the tradable domestic commodities.
The responsivenessof export demands to changes in the world prices of exports are
represented by the values of the export demand elasticity parameters.
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The equations of the model, drawn from Dixon et al. [6], are summarized in
the Appendix.l Equations AI-A9 describe the product and factor markets. Pro-
ducers are assumed to minimize the cost of producing a given activity-level, subject
to production functions of a three-level form. At the first level, we have the Leontief
assumption of no substitution between commodity categories, or between them and
an aggregate of primary factors. At the second level, we have CES aggregation
functions describing substitution possibilities between domestic and imported
commodities of the same type, and also CRESH functions describing substitution
between aggregate primary factors - labour, capital and land.2 At the third level,
we have CRESH functions describing substitution prospects between different types
of land within the aggregate land category. The solution to the optimization prob-
lems yields the sy~tem of commodity demand equations for current production and
capital creation, summarized by equations A.l and A.2, and also the system of
factor demand equations, summarized by equations A.3- A6 and A.9.
Formally, the production function in sector j is written as follows:
p~. a measure of the ease of substitution, and 'Y~.the normalizing constant. On theu U
other hand, given Yj' the producer decides on the amounts of labour, capital and
land to be employed. In particular, we assume that labour (L .), capital (K.) and landJ J
(A.) in the agricultural sector are combined to form effective units of the primary-J .
factor input according to the CRESH function:
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where 0., 1f.(i = £, k, a) and v denote the constant parameters. The advantage of this
I I
function over CES is that it allows the elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital to differ from that between capital and agricultural land. Regarding agri-
cultural land we assume that it is an aggregateof irrigated and rain-fed land, and that
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where A I ' denotes irrigated land, AR . the rain-fed land, and ('YO!, a?1 , pO.l)the con-J J J J J
stant parameters. In the non-agricultural sectors we abstract from consideration of
land as an input and assume that labour and capital provide the effective primary in-
put according to the CES-equations:
° ° -liP?
Yj = rjo [~o L;Pj + (1 - a?) KjPj ] J
where Q. denotes the output of sector j, x.. the effective intermediate input ofJ U
sector i into sector j, a.. the fixed input-output coefficient, Y. effective primaryIJ J
input into sector j, and b. the required amount of Y. to produce one unit of Q.J J J.
To produce Q. units of output, the producer requires x.. = a.. Q. units of effective
J IJ IJ J
intermediate input and Y. = b. Q. units of effective primary input. Given x.. theJ J J U
producer decides on the amounts of intermediate inputs from domestic and im-
ported sources that will be employed. Thus, by distinguishing these two sources
we allow for the possibility that imported commodities may not be perfectly sub-
stitutable for the corresponding domestic product, and this idea of imperfect sub-
stitutability is captured by assuming that domestic and imported commodities pro-
vide the effective input according to the CES equation
1 1 1
x.. = r~. [a~.D-:-:-Pij+ (1- a~.)M::-PiiJ-lIPij
IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ I)
We assume that producers are competitive. They consider all input and output
prices as exogenously given, and select the input levels which minimize the cost of
producing each levelof output. The solution of this minimization problem yields the
input demand functions summarized by equations A.I - A.9 in the Appendix.
On the final demand side, we consider consumption and investment demand.
The average consumer is assumed to maximize the utility function of the Stone-
Geary form,3 yielding the well-known linear expenditure system. Given the utility
function of the form
where D.. denotes the domestic intermediate input of commodity i by sector j, Moou u
the imported intermediate input of commodity i by sector j, a~j the input weight,
n -
u(Cl ' . . . , C ) = L O. Qn(C.- e.)n I I I
i = 1
lDixon et aZ. provide an exhaustive algebraic treatment of the derivation of the equation
system. A complete list of the model equation is contained in Vincent [13 J. Togan [12J gives a
full description of our model.
2For a discussion ofCRESH functions, see Hanoch [9J.
where C. denotes effective consumption of good i, and 5. and e. (i=I, . . ., n) are theI - n - I I
constant parameters with 5. > 0 for all i and L O. = 1. Weallow the consumer to
I i= 1 '
satisfy his demand for any good i by drawing on imported and domestic sources,
3See Stone [11] and Geary [8].
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with the two sources providing imperfect substitutes. The idea of imperfect substi-
tutability is captured again by writing the effective consumption of good i according
to the CES function:
c
[ - C _p~ ]
-I/Pi
C. = Y; C,o (d.) Pi +(1-~){~) II I I
where D~ denotes consumption of domestic commodity i and At: represents con-I I
sumption of imported commodity. Maximization of the nested utility function,
subject to the budget constramt, yields the consumption functions of equations
A.l-A.2 in the Appendix. Finally, regarding the production of capital goods we
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where Z. denotes the number of units of fixed capital created for industry j, X~.J . Q
the effective input of good i for creating capital for industry j, and a~. the fixed
IJ
positive production coefficient. The effective input is provided by domestic and
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where D~. denotes the demand for capital creation of domestic commodity i byIJ
sector j and M~. the demand for capital creation of imported commodity i by sectorIJ
j. Weassume that producers of capital treat input prices as beyond their control, and
for any amount of capital creation (Z.) they choose the domestic and importedJ
inputs to minimize the cost of production. The solution of this minimization prob-
lem yields the demand functions for capital creation given in equations A.I-A.2
in the Appendix.
Competitive pricing behaviour is imposed by equations A.lO - A.l4, relating
prices to cost for each of the activities of current production, capital creation,
exporting and importing. Equations A.l5 and A.16 define, respectively, the con-
sumer price index and the capital goods price index. We also note that the system
of equations summarized in the Appendix is homogenous of degree zero in com-
modity and factor prices so that only relative prices can be determined. Some sort
of normalization of prices is required. In the following we assume that the index
of consumer prices is constant, implying that monetary authorities control the
money supply during the adjustment period.
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Although time enters the model through equations A.21 - A.25, which deter-
mine the accumulation of capital, the model is essentially static. Equation A.21
defines the current rate of return on capital in industry j. Weassume that investors
are cautious in assessing the effects of expanding capital stock, and define the ex-
pected rate of return as follows:







where K.(O) denotes the current level of capital stock, K.{l) the level of capitalJ - J
stock at the end of the period (final period), and (30the elasticity of the expectedJ
rate of return schedule in industry j with respect to the increase in the planned
capital stock in industry j. We assume that total investment is so allocated that the
expected rate of returns are equal across all industries so that equation A.22 is
satisfied. Furthermore, we assume that total capital stock is fixed, and that capital
is allocated in such a way that the return on capital in each sector equals the com-
mon absolute rate of return on capital.
Consideration of the equations in Section 5 of the Appendix reveals that the
model has been closed with LA ILNA and ilc ratios considered as havingbeen deter-
mined exogenously. Obviously, one could consider the ilc ratio as depending on,
among others, monetary and fiscal policies, and the LA ILNA ratio as depending on
the ratio of the rural wage rate to the urban wage rate.4 But this will complicate
the analysis considerably, and it is unnecessary as the effect of external shocks on








3. EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY REGIMES
The model described above and presented in the Appendix is used in this
section to study the effects of outward-oriented and inward-oriented policies. Since
this type of analysis requires determination of parameter values and initialization of
the model, we consider the case of Turkey, the structural characteristics of which are
summarized in Table 1. Following Dervis et al. [4], we assume a sudden and
permanent decrease in the normal flow of foreign resources (F in equation A.20 in
the Appendix). The shortfall in foreign-resource transfer is assumed to amount to
$ 650 million, constituting about 3 percent of the Turkish GNP in the base year.
Faced with this shock, the country has to adjust itself to it. It can respond to the
external shock by squeezing imports, which would slow down the growth. Alter-
natively, it could try to finance the current-account deficit by running down foreign-
exchange reserves or borrowing on international markets. In this paper we do not
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consider such a line of action, but assume instead that the country is able to reduce
its current-account deficit to sustainable levelsover a period of about five years.
Faced with such a task the country can adopt a variety of policy measures to
overcome the ~ffects of the external shock. In this paper we broadly consider two
sets of policies: "outward-oriented policies" and "inward-oriented policies". By
inward-oriented policies we imply a mechanism that de-emphasizesthe role of prices
and places reliance on non-price measures in resource allocation. In particular, we
assume that the exchange rate has been fixed by the government below its equilib-
rium level. On the other hand, outward-oriented policies represent a mechanism
whereby all prices, including the exchange rate, are flexible. Prices so adjust them-
selves as to equate demand and supply in commodity and factor markets as well as in
the balance of payments. Thus, under outward-oriented strategies the country aims
at producing products in which it has a comparative advantage.
Within the general-equilibriumtrade model of Section 2, we represent outward-
oriented policies by the system summarized in the Appendix. In this sytem, the
decrease in foreign capital inflow (F) generates an excess demand for foreign
exchange, exerting an upward pressure on the exchange rate (E). The increase in the
exchange rate increases the price of the tradables. Since the price level is assumed to
be constant, the price of the non-tradables has to decrease. As a result, resources will
be attracted away from the non-tradables towards the tradable sector.
Under inward-oriented policies, the exchange rate is fixed. Given the excess
demand situation for foreign exchange, caused by the shortfall in the inflow of
foreign resources, we assume that foreign exchange is allocated through rationing. In
particular, we suppose, following the approach of Derviset al. [4], that a free market
develops for the scarce imports. In this case, those who demand the imported
commodities will bid the price of imports over the customs-clearing price, so that
positive premium rates emerge. Equation A. 14 of the model, Le.
P 2j = P2j (I+t)E
can no longer hold. Since under competition the premium rate has to be uniform
across all sectors, the above equations will be replaced by the relation
P2j = P2j (I + Ij + PR) E (I)
wherePR denotes the premiumrate, the newendogenousvariable.Giventhe exo-
genously specified value of the exchange rate (It), the domestic price of imports will
increase with increases in the premium rate. Thus, under inward-oriented policieswe
assume that adjustment will be achieved through changes in the domestic price of
imports, until import premia so adjust themselves as to clear the balance of
payments.
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The increase in import premia increases the domestic price of imports, which
in turn has three different effects. First, the intermediate input costs increase con-
siderably more in those sectors which have a high ratio of imported inputs to total
intermediate inputs. Since the increase in intermediate input costs reduces the value
added by the sector, sectors with the relatively largest value-added decreaseswill be
adversely affected. These will be the sectors which have a high ratio of imported
inputs to total intermediate inputs. The increase in the domestic price of imports also
has a second effect, which refers to the effect on domestic prices of home-produced
goods due to changes in domestic demand. As long as domestic and imported
commodities are close substitutes (complements), domestic demand for
home-produced goods will increase (decrease) with the increase in the domestic price
of imports. The increase (decrease) in domestic demand in turn increases (decreases)
the price of the commodity, causing an increase (decrease) in the value added. Thus,
the increase in the premium rate will raise (reduce) the value added in import-substi-
tuting (complementing) sectors. As a result, import-substituting sectors will draw
resources away from the rest of the economy. Finally, one should note that in the
case of an import-substituting sector, the increase in the domestic price of imports
will lead to a decrease in the final demand for the commodity. Ignoring this last
effect, one could state that the increase in premium rate will attract resources away
from the nontradable, exportable and import-complementing sectors towards import-
substituting sectors, which do not have a relatively high ratio of imported inputs to
total intermediate inputs.
To re-examine the debate between the structuralists and the neo-classicists,
we use different assumptions about the values of key trade elasticities. In particular,
we consider three sets of values for these parameters. We call "low elasticities" the
set of values for trade-substitution and export-demand elasticities, which represents
the views of the structuralists. "Medium elasticities" refer to the set of trade elas-
ticities which are three times those under "low elasticities", and "high elasticities"
refer to the set of trade elasticities which are three times those under "medium
elasticities". Thus high elasticities represent the assumption of high substitutability
between domestic goods and imports and of high export-demand elasticities as
assumed by the neoclassicists.5
To study the effects of the exogenous shock under different policy regimes, we
assume that the economy is initially in internal and external equilibrium, so that the
equations in the Appendix are satisfied. Next, we consider the exogenous shock. To
analyse the effects of this shock under the policy of outward orientation, we
linearize the system by logarithmic differentiation, and then solvethe endogenousvari-
ables by using simple matrix methods. Under the policy of inward orie~tation, we use
5See the last two columns of Table 1 for the values of trade elasticities used in the model.
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the same set of equations, but replace now equation A.l4 in the Appendix by the







From Table 2 it follows that restoration of equilibrium in the balance of pay-
ments requires a 2.3-percent devaluation under high elasticities, and a 40.4- percent
devaluation under low elasticities. Thus, the required rate of devaluation increases
with decreases in the values of trade elasticities. On the other hand, the exchange rate
under rationing is fixed. But now premium rate increases due to rationing, causingan
increase in the domestic price of imports, which in turn exceeds the increase under
devaluation. Furthermore, we note that the premium rate increases with decreases in
the values of trade elasticities.
From Table 3, which summarizes the values of aggregate export- and import-
elasticities, it follows that these elasticities depend on policy regimes, and that, there-
fore, they have to be used with care.
Finally, we note that the real GDP declines in all cases, and that for a given
policy regime, the GDPloss increases with decreases in trade elasticities. Comparisons
of the GDP losses under the two policy regimes reveal that outward-oriented strate-
gies are not always the best policy regime in terms of minimizing GDP changes.
Contrary to the conclusions of Dervis et al. [4], the adoption of outward-oriented
policies under elasticity pessimismleads to larger decreases.
Now, using the model, we can re-examine the debate between the structuralists
and the neoclassicists. From Table 2 it follows that the real GDPloss increases with
decreases in trade-elasticity values irrespective of whether the country follows out-
ward-oriented or inward-oriented trade strategies. Comparisons of the GDP losses
under the two policy regimes reveal that outward-oriented strategies are not always
the best policy regime in terms of minimizing GDPchanges. Contrary to the conclu-
sions of Dervis et al. [4] who maintain that adjustment to an exogenous fall in
foreign-exchange inflow by means of inward-oriented policies is three to four times
as costly in terms of the lost GDPas adjustment by means of outward-oriented strat-
egies, adoption of outward-oriented policies under elasticity pessimism leads to
larger decreases in the GDP than adoption of inward-oriented policies.6 From Table
2 it follows that outward-oriented policies are more costly in terms of GDP under
low elasticities, and that inward-oriented policies are more costly under medium and
high elasticities. Thus, in terms of minimizing GDPlosses the best choice of a policy
regime depends on the values of trade elasticities. Under the conditions assumed by
structuralists, the best choice turns out to be one of inward-oriented strategies and,
under the conditions assumed by neoclassicals,that of outward-oriented strategies.
I





Macroeconomic Effects of Alternative Policy Regimes (Percent Changes from the Base Run)
Outward-Qriented Strategies Inward-Oriented Strategies
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
Real GDP -0.37 -0.91 -4.09 -0.94 -1.19 -1.84
Exchange Rate 2.32 7.83 40.45 - - -
Domestic Price
of Importsl 2.32 7.83 40.45 11.85 36.30 106.70
Foreign Price
of Exports2 -2.44 -8.29 -42.30 -0.60 -1.51 -3.70 Co'}
1::'
""'-
Real Imports (volume) -5.60 -6.58 -12.43 -23.35 -24.78 -27.04 s.:
Real Exports (volume) 31.74 36.24 62.20 5.48 4.43 3.53
;:,:Real Wage -1.05 -2.39 -9.16 -2.44 -6.81 -18.91
Share of Labour in GDP -0.68 -1.48 -5.07 -1.50 -5.62 -17.07
lWeighted average using import share weights.
2Weighted average using export share weights-
Table 3
Aggregate Export and Import Elasticities
Outward-Oriented Strategies Inward..Qriented Strategies
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
Export Elasticity 13.01 4.37 1.47 9.13 2.93 0.95










Terms of Trade Effect (% Changes from Base Run) ....,
Outward-Oriented Strategies Inward-Oriented Strategies
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
Terms of Trade Effect -0.21 -0.70 -3.56 -0.05 -0.13 -0.31
Real GDP at constant
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The ranking of the two policy regimeschanges completely as we abstract from
consideration of changes in the terms of trade. From Table 4 it follows that the real
GDP that abstracts from consideration of the terms of trade effects and which we
call GDP at constant base-year prices, declines as before in all cases, and that the
decline is smaller when elasticities are high. Furthermore, outward-oriented strategies
are now the best regime, irrespective of the values of trade elasticities. Thus, by
abstracting from changes in the terms of trade we get the same ordering of policy
regimes as derived by Dervis et al. [4]. But this approach has its shortcomings. The
adjustment to external shocks takes about four to five years, and over this period the
terms of trade change, the extent of which is summarized in Table 4. To be a satis-
factory measure of changesin potential welfare, the GDP, over a period of about five
years, has to incorporate the changes in the terms of trade.
From the above considerations it follows that the reason why our results
deviate from those of Derviset al. [4] is that our measure of GDPincorporates the
terms of trade changes, whereas the measure of GDP used by Derviset al. completely
abstracts from these changes.
Comparing the figures for real GDP in Table 2 yields a ranking of alternative
policies different from that of Dervis et al. [4]. Under low elasticities, inward-
oriented strategies are the best policy, and under medium and high elasticities out-
ward-oriented strategies are the best policy. Thus, one of the reasons why policy
makers in a large number of developing countries have adopted interventionist
policies could now be explained by the policy makers' perception of the trade
elasticity values. Thus, policy makers adopting outward-oriented strategies could be
supposed to concentrate on either real GDP measuresabstracting from terms of trade
changes or on real GDP-measures incorporating terms of trade effects. However,
in the case of Turkey whose aggregate export elasticity is 3.1, outward-oriented
strategies would be the best policy.7
An alternative explanation of why policy makers have adopted interventionist
policies is provided by de Melo and Robinson (10], whose arguments could be ex-
plained with the help of Table 3. From this table it follows that after the external
shock workers lose and capitalists gain regardless of the adjustment mechanism. But
the loss of workers under inward-oriented strategies is about twice as large as that
under outward-oriented strategies, and capitalists gain much more under inward-
oriented strategies than under outward-oriented strategies. The reason why certain
policies are adopted could further be explained in terms of the political power of the
two socio-economic groups. Considering workers and capitalists as homogenous
7When trade elasticities are 70 percent of those under medium elasticities, the GDP loss
under outward-oriented strategies equals that under inward-oriented strategies. In this case the
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groups, one could state that as the relative political power of capitalists increases, the
country switches from outward-oriented strategies to inward-oriented policies, and as
the relative political power of workers increases the country adopts the non-interven-
tionist policy of outward-oriented strategies. Since workers form a large fraction of
the population, one would expect the policy of outward-oriented strategies to be
adopted in countries where franchise matters and where majority rule determines the
policy regime, provided the electorate is well-informed about the benefits and costs
of alternative policy regimes.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has re-examined the consequences of the two policy regimes: out-
ward-oriented and inward-oriented policies. Usinga general-equilibriumtrade model,
we have shown that outward-oriented strategies are more costly in terms of the lost
GDP under conditions assumed by structuralists, and that inward-oriented strategies
are more costly in terms of the lost GDP under conditions assumed by neoclassicals,
when the measure of GDP incorporates changes in the terms of trade. Thus, our
analysis supports the view that in terms of minimizing GDPlosses the best choice of
a policy regime depends on the values of trade elasticities. Furthermore, the choice
of policy regimes has a significant impact on the distribution of income. Thus, the
unwillingness of some of the developing countries' governments to pursue outward-
oriented policies could be explained in terms of the low trade-elasticity values
supposedly perceived by the policy makers of those countries, and/or by the political
power exercised by capitalists, who seem to lose most under outward-oriented
policies.
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Appendix
EQUAnONS OF THE MODEL
(Exogenous variablesand parameters are denoted by letters with a bar)
1. Product and factor markets
n
~ D.. (Pl " P2 " Q.) + D~ (PII ,..., P I 'P 21 ," ., P 2 ,C) +
J= I IJ I I J Inn
n
~ D!. (Pl " P 2 " Z.) + E. =Q. (i = 1,..., n)
J=I IJ I I J I I
n
j:l Mij (Pli' P2i' QJ) + ~ (Pll ,. . ., PIn' P21,. ., P2n' C) +
n
'~l M~(PI .,P 2 ., Z.)=M.J= IJ I I J I
n
~A L~ (w1, JJ., W13, w;, QJ) = LAj= I J J
(i=l,...,n)
n
j = ~ L':'A (WI ,w~,Q)=LNA
n + 1 J NA J J
A
K1 (w~, wfl W~, W~, QJ) = K1(O) (j =1,...,nA)
KfA (w1A' Wj~QJ) = KfA (0) (j = nA +1 ,. . ., n)
LA+LNA=I
nA n
~ K~ (0) + ~ K':'A (0)= K (0)
i -I J j=n + I J- A
nA Q I 2 3 3 --Q~ A. (WA ' Wi ' WI ' W2 ' Q.) - Ai= I J J (Q= 1,2)
where
D,/Mij) = inter-industry demand of domestic (imported)
commodity i by sector j












d..(M~) = demand for capital creation of domestic (imported)II II
commodity i by sector j 2. Prices














P I .Q. =I I
= output (import) of commodity i
= export of domestic commodityi
= total consumption expenditure
PI .Q. =I I
= investment by sector of destination
=demand for agricultural labour by sector j 1T.Y. =I I
= demand for non-agricultural labour by sector j Plj =





td. =indirect tax rate of sector jI
-cn =
= total labour force nI =
= demand for capital by agricultural sector j
=demand for land category Qby sector j
t.I
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n n
I: PliD.. + I: P2M.. + W~L1 + W~K1 (0)
i= 1 II i= 1 I II I I I
+ 2 3 Q -I: W Q A. + td. Pl ' Q.
Q=1 I I I I
(j=l ,. . . ,nA)
n n
I: P D.. + I: P M.. + wI Ll'!A + W~Kl'!A (0)
i= 1 11 II i= 1 21' II N A I I I
+ t(f,P I ' Q.I I I (j = nA + I ,. . ., n)
n ~T n II: Pl ' LT.. + I: P 2 ' M.i= 1 "1 i= 1 "1
(j=I,... ,n)
* -
P Ij (1 + Vj )E
p (1 + "'i.)E
2j I
n c (P ,... ,PI , P21 ' . . . 'P 2 )11 n n
nI (1T , 1T )1 n
1T. = price of capital in sector jI
=supply of land category Q
*
P Ij =foreign price of exports of sector j
P 2j =foreign price of imported commodity j
= average wage of agricultural labour
V. =export subsidy rate of sector jI= average wage of non-agricultural labour
= rental rate of capital by sector j E =exchange rate
= average rent of land category Q =tariff rate of sector j
= aggregate capital tic =consumer price index












E. = E,P l 'I I I (A.17 )
n
e = ~ p* E
j= 1 Ij j
(A. 18)
n -
m = ~ P2. M.
j= I J J
(A.19 )
m-e = F (A. 20)
where
5.
17;= export demand elasticity in sector i
e = foreign currency value of exports
m = foreign currency value of imports
















j =1 .' . . , n (A. 22)
where
R J0) = R R.
J J
j = 1 , . . . , n (A.23)
K.(1) = K.(O) + Y. - d. K. (0)
J J J J J
j =1 ,. . . , n (A.24)
n
I = ~ 1f.Y.
j= 1 J J
(A.25)
where
R.( 0) = rate of return on capital in sector jJ
~. = elasticity of the expected rate of return schedule in industry j withJ
respect to increases in the planned capital stock in industry j
R = absolute rate of return on capital
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R. = variable representing the ratio of rate of return on capital in sector j
J
to absolute rate of return on capital
d.
J = rate of depreciation of capital in sector j
= expected rate of return on capitalA
K.(1)= capital stock of sector j in the finalperiod
J














c = real consumption
= real investment




wk = real wage oflabour category k (k =ANA)
f = variable representing the ratio of real investment to real consump-
tion
GDP = real gross domestic product
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REFERENCES
1. Armington, P.S. "Adjustment of Trade Balances: Some Experiments with a
Model of Trade among Many Countries". IMF Staff Papers. Vol. 17, No.3.
November 1970.
Armington, P.S. "The Geographic Pattern of Trade and the Effects of Price
Changes". IMF Staff Papers. Vol. 16, No.2. July 1969.
Balassa,B. "The Newly Industrializing DevelopingCountries after the OilCrisis".
WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv. Vol. 17. 1981.
Dervis, K., J, de Melo and S. Robinson. "A General Equilibrium Analysis of
Foreign Exchange Shortages in a Developing Economy". Economic Journal.
Vol. 91, No. 364. December 1981.
Dervis,K., J. de Me10and S. Robinson. GeneralEquilibrium Models for Develop-
ment Policy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. 1982.
Dixon, P.B., B.R Parmenter and D.P. Vincent. GRANI A Multisectoral Model of
the Australian Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 1982.
Fischer, G., and K. Frohberg. Simplified National Models: The Condensed
Version of the Food and Agricultural Model System of the International
Institute for Systems Analysis. Laxenburg,Austria: IIASA. 1980. (WP-80-56)
Geary, RC. "A Note on 'A Constant Utility Index of the Cost of Living'."
Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 18. 1950-51.
Hanoch, G. "CRESH Production Functions". Econometrica. Vol. 39, No.5.
September 1971.
de Me10,J., and S. Robinson. "Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribu-
tion in Three Archetype Developing Economies '. Journal of Development
Economics. Vol. 10, No.1. February 1982.
Stone, R "Linear Expenditure Systems and Demand Analysis: An Application
to the Pattern of British Demand". Economic Journal. Vol. 64. September
1954.
Togan, S. "A General Equilibrium Model of the Turkish Economy: Sectoral
Design, Data Base and Parameter Estimates". Ankara: Dept. of Economics,
Middle East Technical University. 1982. (Unpublished paper)
Vincent, D.P. Multisectoral Economic Models for Developing Countries: A
Theoretical Framework and an Illustration of their Usefulnessfor Determin-
ing Some Implications of UNCTADProposalsfor Commodity Market Reforms.
Kiel: Institut FUrWeltwirtschaft. 1981. (Kiel WorkingPaper,No. 117)
World Bank. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.
1981.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
